Publications

April 2022 Games

Correcting for Random Budgets in Revealed Preference Experiments

(Joint with John Rehbeck)

We examine how the random budget method in revealed preference experiments interact with measures of choice consistency.

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Working Papers

Global Games with Strategic Substitutes: An Experimental Investigation

(Job Market Paper)
We experimentally investigate behavior in a market entry game with strategic substitutes using the Global Games paradigm of Harrison and Jara-Moroni (2021). Our experiment provides some support for the theory. A majority of the subjects adopt threshold strategies with few mistakes. While the estimated thresholds deviate from point predictions, the comparative statics still hold. Finally, a majority of outcomes correspond to the global games equilibrium even in regions of multiplicity.

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To follow the Herd or break away? Overconfidence and Social Learning

(Joint with Jason Tayawa)

We experimentally analyze how overconfidence in one’s relative expertise impacts social learning in the lab. We modify the social learning settings of Anderson and Holt (1997) to allow for signal accuracy to vary with an individual’s skill. Our results show that overconfidence can affect welfare in social learning settings by inducing people to break away from existing herds.

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Understanding Entry Games using Laboratory Experiments

(joint with John Rehbeck – Submitted)

We examine how economic experiments can be used to examine behavior in entry games.

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Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in Public Goods Games: Comparing Teams with Individuals

(joint with John Kagel and Christina Gore)

We investigate behavior in Public Goods Games under both monetary and non-monetary punishment options with teams of two as decision makers. We find that teams are teams contribute significantly lower under non-monetary punishment, compared to monetary punishment.

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Sharing information: Could Experts Consolidate?

(Joint with Jason Tayawa)

We develop a model of information sharing using cooperative game theory. We demonstrate non-existence of the core under standard assumptions in the literature (perfect correlation or conditional independence). We find that strong complementarity of information structures is sufficient for the existence of a core.

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