We investigate behavior in Public Goods Games under both monetary and non-monetary punishment options with teams of two as decision makers. We find that teams are teams contribute significantly lower under non-monetary punishment, compared to monetary punishment.

We develop a model of information sharing using cooperative game theory. We demonstrate non-existence of the core under standard assumptions in the literature (perfect correlation or conditional independence). We find that strong complementarity of information structures is sufficient for the existence of a core.

We analyze the time minimization assignment problem through the lens of matching theory to incorporate notions of stability. We find inconclusive evidence of any particular mechanism outperforming any others.

I experimentally investigate behavior in a game with strategic substitutes using the Global Games paradigm of Carlsson and van Damme (1993). Leveraging uniqueness results from Harrison and Jara-Moroni (2020), I design an experiment to investigate strategic behavior in a market-entry setting under payoff certainty (complete information) and payoff uncertainty (incomplete information).

We experimentally analyze how overconfidence in one’s relative expertise impacts cascade formation in the lab. We modify the informational cascade settings of Anderson and Holt (1997) and Noth and Weber (2003) to allow for signal accuracy to vary with an individual’s skill. Leveraging results from Moore and Healy (2008), we hypothesize that over-estimation in one’s ability, and over-placement of one’s ability (relative to others) end up delaying cascade formation. We design an experiment to test this hypothesis.

I analyze the effects of a divestiture in the US male deodorant industry following the P&G-Gillette merger in 2005. Simulations suggest that compared to a no merger baseline, the divestiture reduces prices on average and raises consumer welfare.