Global Games with Strategic Substitutes: An Experimental Investigation

(**Job Market Paper**) We experimentally investigate behavior in a market entry game with strategic substitutes using the Global Games paradigm of Harrison and Jara-Moroni (2021). Our experiment provides some support for the theory. A majority of the subjects adopt threshold strategies with few mistakes. While the estimated thresholds deviate from point predictions, the comparative statics still hold. Finally, a majority of outcomes correspond to the global games equilibrium even in regions of multiplicity.

To follow the Herd or break away? Overconfidence and Social Learning

(*Joint with [Jason Tayawa](https://sites.google.com/view/jasontayawa/)*) We experimentally analyze how overconfidence in one's relative expertise impacts social learning in the lab. We modify the social learning settings of Anderson and Holt (1997) to allow for signal accuracy to vary with an individual's skill. Our results show that overconfidence can affect welfare in social learning settings by inducing people to break away from existing herds.